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1. Introduction 
 
Near the end of his continuation of Paul the Deacon‟s History of the Lombards, the late-
ninth century historian Andrew of Bergamo recorded the death of the emperor Louis II 
(855-75), in whose funeral he had participated.
1
  Louis was in many ways the central 
figure of Andrew‟s text, and he regarded the emperor‟s demise as having grave 
consequences: „after his death a great tribulation came to Italy‟ he lamented in his 
penultimate extant chapter.
2
  Italy had been ruled since 774 by the Carolingians, a 
Frankish dynasty from north of the Alps.  The disintegration of their empire in 888, 
followed by several decades during which the political landscape was dominated by 
complex struggles between rival rulers and aristocratic factions, has given Andrew‟s 
gloomy statement the ring of eery prophecy.
3
  By the time the powerful Saxon king Otto I 
arrived to assert himself on this fractured landscape in the 950s, he was but the latest in a 
long line of transalpine rulers who sought to benefit from the internecine divisions which 
ran through the Italian political community.  It is little wonder that Liutprand of 
Cremona, the kingdom‟s next major historian, looked back from Otto‟s reign over the 
pockmarked history of the previous half century and remarked that „the Italians always 
like to have two kings, so that they can use one to terrorise the other.‟4  Accordingly, 
modern historians have come to agree that 875 was a major turning point in Italian 
political history, and that the historical era bookended by Louis‟s death and Otto‟s arrival 
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(and by the remarks of Andrew and Liutprand) should be regarded as a distinct period, 
characterised above all by weak kingship and conflict between aristocratic factions.
5
 
 
This is hard to argue with as a general description of this period, which coincides with an 
era of uncertainty across the continent between the end of the Carolingian Empire and the 
rise of its Ottonian successor, but it is more difficult to explain why warring aristocratic 
factions came to dominate the political stage.  Historians have tended to avoid this 
question by using a generalised vocabulary of „chaos‟ and „crisis‟ derived from two 
central assumptions: that groups within the Italian nobility harboured „pro-French‟ and 
„pro-German‟ sympathies6; and that the aristocracy „rose‟ in the ninth century at the 
expense of the kings.
7
  In this view, most systematically and influentially expounded in a 
classic article by Hagen Keller, the weak post-Louis II kings were not only unable to 
restrain their nobles but were even forced to recognise, empower and institutionalise 
rising aristocratic power.
8
  However, recent scholarship has thrown doubt on the central 
assumptions underpinning these arguments, which ultimately stem from the grand 
narratives of European history established in the nineteenth century.  Historians are 
increasingly cautious about both the projection of modern national identities onto the past 
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and the characterisation of relationships between kings and aristocrats as a zero-sum 
game in which one became more powerful in direct proportion to the weakness of the 
other.  The fortunes of rulers in this period were determined less by institutional stability 
than by their ability to create and manipulate patronage networks among the nobility, 
whose alliance was essential to the effectiveness of royal power.
9
 
 
Due to the regional traditions of Italian historiography and the relative paucity of 
narrative sources, the implications of all this for the dynastic politics of late-ninth- and 
tenth-century Italy have not been fully explored, with notable exceptions such as Barbara 
Rosenwein‟s important work on the charters of Berengar I (888-924).10  Taking its cue 
from Rosenwein‟s insights, the present article focuses on royal-aristocratic politics 
between about 870 and 890 and aims to throw some light on the detail of a period whose 
political history has hitherto received minimal scholarly attention.  The central argument 
is that most descriptions of the immediate post-Louis II era mischaracterise the 
motivations of both aristocrats and kings, and thus misunderstand the relationship 
between them.  By writing them off as symptomatic of „chaos‟, historians have neglected 
the extent to which the formation of aristocratic factions was conditioned by their 
ongoing relationship with the political centre, whether or not it was strong.  In 
challenging the simple correlation of royal weakness with aristocratic factionalism, I aim 
to restore kings to the political history of this period by emphasising the importance of 
shifts in patterns of dynastic politics and patronage in explaining the behaviour of the 
nobility.
11
  The article is structured chronologically to emphasise change over time, but 
does not seek to provide a comprehensive political narrative.  I will look at the factors 
shaping royal patronage of the aristocracy in two distinct periods: the immediate 
aftermath of Louis II‟s death; and the reign of the last Carolingian king of Italy, Charles 
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the Fat.  By way of conclusion, I contrast my findings with the period after the end of the 
empire in 888. 
 
2. Aristocratic factions and the death of Louis II (875) 
 
As Andrew lamented, the immediate aftermath of Louis II‟s death was indeed turbulent.  
The wealthy Italian realm, with the associated imperial title, was much coveted by 
various of the late ruler‟s transalpine relatives who were poised to take advantage of his 
heirlessness.  Louis‟s uncle, the west Frankish king Charles the Bald, emerged victorious 
after fighting off the east Frankish bid of his cousin Karlmann of Bavaria.  The conflict 
came perilously close to open warfare, unusual in Frankish politics of the ninth century, 
and much incidental damage was done to the property of various important Lombard 
monasteries.
12
  The intrigues did not come to an end when Karlmann succeeded Charles 
as Italian king in 877.  The king‟s ill health (he may have suffered a stroke) kept him in 
Bavaria most of the time and his relatives began jostling for position to succeed him.  
Meanwhile, Pope John VIII, indignant at Karlmann‟s failure to defend Rome from 
Muslim and aristocratic assailants, travelled to Troyes in 878 and invited Louis the 
Stammerer, Charles the Bald‟s son, to take up the imperial dignity.13   
 
For present purposes, the intricacies of these events are less important than the deep 
divisions within the aristocracy that underpinned them.  Immediately following Louis II‟s 
death the major nobles of northern Italy divided into two factions: one, based in the north 
east, supported the claim of Karlmann to the throne; the other, focused on Milan in the 
north west, supported Charles the Bald.  It is clear that these groups were regarded by 
contemporaries as relatively coherent factions.  Paolo Delogu‟s analysis of the charter 
evidence showed that while Charles the Bald reigned the Milan faction prospered and the 
north-easterners were deliberately excluded from the circuits of royal patronage; and that 
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the reverse held true once Karlmann came to power.
14
  These groups had acknowledged 
leaders.  The north-eastern faction was led by the marchio Berengar of Friuli and the 
widowed Empress Engelberga, and included other influential figures such as Bishop 
Wibod of Parma.  Berengar was the guardian of Louis and Engelberga‟s daughter, and 
papal letters imply he was perceived to have the ability to control the loyalties of the 
north-eastern nobility.
15
  The other grouping was focused on Archbishop Ansbert of 
Milan and backed initially by Pope John.  The extent of Ansbert‟s influence is illustrated 
by a subsequent dispute with the pope.  After the archbishop and his subordinate prelates 
failed to meet John on his return from west Francia in 878, the pope excommunicated 
him.
16
  However, the anathema was not observed in the north-west, where, much to 
John‟s disgust, Ansbert managed to consecrate a new bishop to the see of Vercelli with 
the approval of his subordinates.  The precise issue at stake in the dispute is unclear, but 
may have been connected with the question of the succession: in one letter the pope 
forbade the archbishop to confer with any would-be king without permission.
17
  It is 
striking that John thought Ansbert was in a position to intervene decisively in the 
succession to the Italian throne.  This suggests his influence extended to the formation of 
opinion among the secular aristocracy as well as the bishops of the north-west.   
 
How and why did these factions come into being?  Our starting point must be the 
observation that they appeared fully-formed in 875, and were already being played out at 
Louis‟s funeral: having been buried in Brescia, a power-base of Engelberga, the king was 
subsequently disinterred and translated to Milan by Ansbert.
18
  Rather than reading the 
prominence of these factions as a symptom of royal weakness after 875, we must 
therefore seek reasons for their formation within the pattern of Carolingian politics before 
Louis‟s death. 
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The politics of the Carolingian dynasty during the 860s were defined by the extended 
divorce case of Lothar II, the king of middle Francia, on whose outcome depended a 
series of succession issues.
19
  It was only towards the end of the decade, and especially 
after Lothar‟s death in 869, that the succession to his heirless brother Louis II became an 
increasingly pressing diplomatic issue.  The rise of Italy to the top of the agenda is 
reflected in the meeting held in 868 by Louis‟s uncles Charles the Bald and Louis the 
German, kings of west and east Francia respectively, who agreed that if the opportunity 
arose they would divide their nephews‟ realms between them.20  Meanwhile Pope 
Hadrian II (867-72) dangled the promise of his backing before both rulers.
21
  Recognising 
the mounting importance of the issue, in 872 the Empress Engelberga travelled north for 
discussions with both Louis the German and Charles the Bald about the succession, 
hoping in return to acquire influence in Francia.  However, only Louis was ready to make 
such concessions, and received in return guarantees that his eldest son Karlmann would 
succeed the heirless emperor; Charles refused to negotiate.
22
  Shortly before Louis II 
died, the east Frankish king renewed this deal by making a grant of Italian properties to 
the emperor‟s daughter: he must have received these estates, which were normally 
controlled by female members of the Italian ruling dynasty, from Engelberga during the 
original negotiations in 872.
23
 
 
Developments in papal-east Frankish relations interacted with these events.  As the 
pontificate of Hadrian II drew to a close, news arrived that the Bulgars, whose 
ecclesiastical allegiance had been a recent bone of contention between Rome and 
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Constantinople, had succumbed to the insistent overtures of the Byzantine church.  
Fearing that the influence of the Greek rite might reach even further west, Hadrian 
approved the request of the Slavic prince Kocel (a Frankish client) to revive the ancient 
see of Sirmium and appoint the Greek missionary Methodius as archbishop of Pannonia 
and Moravia, and papal legate to the Slavs.
24
  This decision greatly angered the 
archbishop of Salzburg and his suffragans, who considered the evangelisation of the 
Slavs as part of their natural remit.  A pamphlet was produced to bolster the Salzburg 
case, and helped the archbishop to draw Louis the German into the dispute.
25
  Louis had 
his own aspirations on the eastern frontier which coincided with the interests of the 
aggrieved prelates, and following military action Methodius was captured, condemned 
before a kangaroo court of Salzburg suffragans and confined to a monastery.  On his 
succession in December 872, John VIII immediately turned up the pressure on Louis over 
the Methodius affair, pressing for the missionary‟s release and attempting to place 
Pannonia directly under papal control.  John also summoned the bishops who had tried 
Methodius to Rome, threatened them with excommunication, and began to make 
overtures to Charles the Bald, Louis‟s rival.26  At exactly the time when Louis II and 
Engelberga were establishing close political links with the east Frankish royal family, 
therefore, the pope was adopting a hostile stance towards them. 
 
The stage was thus set for a dispute.  Louis II may well have foreseen the trouble these 
dormant tensions would cause after his death, and he seemingly brokered a reconciliation 
between the pope and the east Frankish king at Verona in 874.
27
  Yet this last-minute 
display of solidarity cannot mask the fact that the succession to Louis II had by this time 
been a matter of open dispute for some years.  This uncertainty provides a context for the 
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formation of political factions within Italy: the contrasting relationships being 
simultaneously formed by the papacy and the imperial couple with the east and west 
Frankish rulers must have had a significant role in shaping Italian aristocratic loyalties.  
These relationships legitimised the adoption of mutually exclusive positions on the part 
of the nobles. 
 
The pressure on leading aristocrats to declare for one or other side was intensified by 
active lobbying on the part of both claimants, who doggedly courted opinion-formers in 
Italy in the early years of the 870s through the regular dispatch of embassies.
28
  More 
importantly, both kings were willing to press their claims with decisive and sometimes 
violent political manoeuvres.  In 871, when a false rumour spread that Louis II had been 
killed, Louis the German immediately sent his youngest son Charles the Fat to establish 
east Frankish influence in the Italian-controlled area around Lake Geneva which included 
important Alpine passes.
29
  In response to the same rumour, Charles the Bald imprisoned 
his rebellious son Carloman, in part to prevent him from trying his luck across the Alps 
and hence to preserve his own opportunity of seizing Italy.
30
  Louis II soon reasserted his 
control of the kingdom.  Within a year, however, the succession prompted another bout 
of political intrigue when a faction of nobles tried to persuade the emperor to divorce 
Engelberga and marry the daughter of Count Winigis of Siena.  It is likely that this 
attempt was underwritten by the Holy See and reflected the pope‟s hostility to the east 
Franks: the pressure was put on Louis while he was in Rome.
31
  Moreover, the attempt to 
undermine Engelberga must have been a reaction to the deal that she had just weeks 
earlier brokered with Louis the German concerning the succession.  The empress herself 
responded to these events by sending letters of friendship to Charles the Bald.  According 
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to the west Frankish annalist Hincmar of Rheims this was done in an attempt to disguise 
the arrangement already made with Louis the German; but it also makes sense as an 
attempt to mollify those Italian magnates who were pressuring her husband to repudiate 
her, and who may thus have preferred the prospect of being ruled by Charles the Bald.  
The record of an assembly held by Charles at this time makes an obtuse reference to Italy 
as a land „that God will grant you hereafter‟, which shows that he, in response to 
Engelberga‟s negotiations with his brother, was girding his loins to pitch a claim to the 
regnum.
32
 
 
All this very physical jostling for position came to a head when Louis died in late 
summer 875, opening up a short-lived but spectacular bout of hot conflict whose course 
confirms the idea that the factional lines between the key players had already been drawn.  
Both Italian factions invited their respective candidates to come and take the throne.
33
  
Charles the Bald immediately moved across the Alps and his brother reacted by invading 
west Francia and sending two of his sons into Italy.
34
  Both east Frankish armies entered 
Italy through Berengar‟s territory.  While one son, Karlmann, confronted Charles the 
Bald, the other, Charles the Fat, was joined by Berengar and „a multitude of the rest of his 
people‟ in an attack on various north-western locations including Milan.35  Hincmar 
clearly refers to the north-eastern faction as „some of the leading men of Italy [who] did 
not come over to Charles [the Bald].‟36  The other faction was alluded to by the Mainz 
annalist in his description of Charles „carving up the kingdom with his followers.‟37  The 
conflict also had repercussions in Rome, where an aristocratic party allied to Formosus, 
sometime bishop of Porto and future pontiff, used the arrival of Karlmann and Charles 
the Fat to bring their opposition to John into the open.
38
  Although on this occasion the 
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pope prevailed, the episode shows how the succession dispute resonated with and 
legitimised conflicts even within Rome itself.
39
 
 
Between 871 and 875, then, the succession to Louis II developed from a relatively 
abstract issue in diplomatic negotiations into a cause of concrete political action on the 
part of Carolingian rulers and their supporters.  Consequently, a hypothetical debate 
about the future became a pressing issue in the political present.  Members of the Italian 
aristocracy were forced to choose sides in advance: loyalties were created, reinforced and 
put into action, not merely projected.   
 
It is more difficult to be sure why individual power-brokers decided which way to jump.  
Although a long-standing east/west division in Lombard political geography helps us 
make some sense of the general pattern, we still have to explain why such a division was 
reactivated at this time.  Bribery and threats must have played a part in this process, as 
they often did in Carolingian politics.  Indeed, an annalist writing at Mainz claimed that 
Charles the Bald‟s ultimate success was more or less exclusively a result of his superior 
ability to bribe the pope.
40
  However, underlying sympathies were also important.  
Berengar‟s support for Karlmann finds a context in the close political links which existed 
between Friuli and Bavaria during the ninth century.
41
  Engelberga, who had consistently 
supported the east Frankish designation since 872, also provided a focal point for the 
north-easterners.
42
  Berengar was the guardian of the empress‟s daughter and was related 
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„Queenship, Nunneries and Royal Widowhood in Carolingian Europe‟, Past and Present 178 (2003), pp. 3-
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to the empress at two generations: his paternal aunt was married to Engelberga‟s cousin, 
while his own wife was her niece.
43
  These immediate associations may have played a 
part in drawing his allegiances away from his maternal uncle Charles the Bald and 
towards his cousin Karlmann.  The north-western faction, on the other hand, must have 
been shaped in part by the influence of archbishop Ansbert.  Behind him stood the pope, 
who had for the most part favoured Charles since 872.
44
  In any case, these antagonistic 
factions were forged in the heat generated by disputes within the Carolingian dynasty, 
and between some of its members and the papacy, during the late 860s and early 870s.  
Existing aristocratic rivalries were given form and legitimacy by wider dynastic conflicts.  
Tensions at the highest level created and resonated with rivalries among the aristocracy, 
sending fault lines down through the bedrock of the political community.  These factions 
did not represent „pro-French‟ and „pro-German‟ interests, but were a product of the 
interaction between political deals, royal interventions, doubt over the future and fast-
moving circumstances. 
 
The significance of these aristocratic groups during the second half of the 870s was not 
so much a symptom of weak kingship as of a situation in which two strong rulers 
disputed the crown.  That these disputes were still articulated within the Carolingian 
dynastic system is illustrated by Bishop Anthony of Brescia‟s letter to his counterpart 
Salomon II of Constance early in the year 878.
45
  Anthony feared that the manoeuvrings 
of the three healthy kings north of the Alps to position themselves to succeed Karlmann 
would end in violence: „we expect with great reluctance the plundering of first one, then 
the other, until they agree amicably among themselves to whom they want to concede 
that province.‟  The anxious bishop added: „accordingly, it is proper that we submit to 
one alone, and serve the rest gladly as far as we can.‟  Salomon, a partisan of Charles the 
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Fat, one of the kings in question, tried to reassure Anthony that the issue was not as 
confused as he feared, and was being settled by negotiation.
46
  The fact that Anthony felt 
compelled to decide which potential ruler to support vividly illustrates the unenviable 
pressure placed on nobles who got caught in the middle of royal disputes.  At the same 
time, it is notable that both bishops assumed the matter would be resolved between the 
ruling Carolingians.  Succession disputes such as the one that produced the Italian 
factions of the 870s were endemic in the Frankish world, and the tribulations which 
followed Louis II‟s death did not stand out qualitatively from the normal texture of 
Carolingian politics: even Anthony, nervous about the future and clearly out of the loop, 
did not doubt that the dispute would be resolved, like numerous earlier ninth-century 
conflicts, within the context of the Carolingian dynasty.
47
  Such tension was a perennial 
by-product of Frankish dynastic politics, not a symptom of Carolingian power entering a 
terminal tailspin after 875. 
 
3. Patterns of patronage, 879-88 
 
The factions that dominated Italian politics in the years 875-9 did not remain absolutely 
static: John VIII, for instance, was ultimately forced to put his trust in Karlmann as 
premature death eroded the list of alternatives.
48
  Nevertheless, they are usually seen by 
historians as playing a key role until at least the 890s.
49
  This view has been encouraged 
by a negative view of the reign of Charles „the Fat‟, Italy‟s last male-line Carolingian 
ruler, whose flaccid grip on power is thought to have handed more power to the 
aristocracy and hastened the rapid descent in the fortunes of Italian kingship after 875.
50
  
However, there are reasons to question this interpretation.  During his eight years as ruler 
of the regnum (November 879-November 887) Charles, called Carlito (Charlie) by the 
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Italians to distinguish him from his uncle,
51
 made no less than six trips across the Alps, 
each lasting between four and ten months.  Over this period he spent around 50% of his 
time in Italy and issued about half of his charters for cisalpine recipients.
52
  Given that 
Charlemagne himself only visited his southern realm four times in 40 years, and Louis 
the Pious never, these figures look even more striking.  The fact that in 882 Charles was 
able to command a Lombard contingent on a campaign against the Vikings on the River 
Meuse strongly suggests that he was not as insignificant a king of Italy as has been 
assumed.
53
 
 
When Charles came to power the most influential figures in Italian affairs, John VIII, 
Engelberga, Berengar and Ansbert, were set against each other to a greater or lesser 
degree, each pursuing their own agendas and carrying significant bodies of opinion with 
them.  However, the new king‟s charters suggest that he made great efforts to avoid the 
problems caused by his predecessors‟ reliance on exclusive factions.  This is illustrated 
by the list of counts present at an assembly in Siena in March 881, who were 
accompanying him back from his imperial coronation in Rome.
54
  They were: Berengar 
of Friuli; John VIII‟s kinsman and comes of the Holy See Farulf; another count called 
Berengar; Count Waltfred of Verona; Bertold count of the palace; Winigis count of 
Siena; Gotfred, count somewhere around Asti; Adalbert, probably the dux of Tuscany; 
Maurinus, active around Ravenna; and Erardus, possibly count in or near Modena.
55
  
These men represented not only wide geographical origins, but also came from all sides 
of the political rifts which had opened up in the years before 879.  Farulf, therefore, was 
able to sit as a representative of the pope alongside Adalbert and Maurinus, two of John 
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VIII‟s most hated opponents during the 870s.56  Maurinus seems to have been an 
associate of Engelberga‟s, as was Gotfred, whom John VIII commanded, along with two 
of her brothers, to protect the empress‟s properties in 879.57  Meanwhile Winigis, as we 
have seen, was at the centre of a faction which in 872 had attempted to force Louis II to 
repudiate Engelberga and marry his daughter instead; and north-western nobles like 
Gotfred and Suppo sat alongside north-easterners like Berengar and Erardus for the first 
time in years.  Attendance at court was not a matter of course.  Presence or absence could 
be a political statement on the part of king or noble, as was the case when one or other 
faction was either excluded or absented itself from major assemblies during the period 
875-9.
58
  Whether or not they had forgotten all their differences, it is significant that 
Charles‟s entourage included men and women who had hitherto been political opponents. 
 
The roots of this concord went back to the very beginning of his reign in Italy.  Charles 
initially requested to meet John VIII at Pavia in November 879, suggesting that he 
preferred this as the venue for his inauguration.
59
  John wrote back to say he could not 
make it, and Charles rescheduled the assembly at Ravenna in early January 880.  Pavia, 
the old centre of the Lombard realm, was not visited often by Carolingian kings, so the 
selection of this north-western venue hints that Charles envisaged a role in his 
inauguration for Ansbert of Milan, friendship with whom he now urged on the pope.  
Their reconciliation was symbolically confirmed at the Ravenna coronation, which was 
presided over by Ansbert, John VIII, and Patriarch Walpert of Aquileia.
60
  The extent to 
which Charles had managed to effect a formal reconciliation between the pope and the 
archbishop is highlighted by the fact that, probably at the same assembly, he succeeded in 
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resolving their dispute over the see of Vercelli by having his archchancellor and chief 
adviser Liutward installed as bishop.
61
 
 
This newly-constructed alliance did not form accidentally: in part, it was the outcome of 
a deliberate royal strategy.  What we know about the significance and stage-management 
of early medieval assemblies suggests that the orchestration of this display of unity would 
have been carefully negotiated in advance.
62
  Charles‟s part in this negotiation may have 
left traces in the first two charters he issued as king for Italian recipients in late 879.  In 
one, he confirmed six holdings in the estate of Limonta near Lake Como to the monastery 
of St-Ambrose in Milan.
63
  This intensely exploited property, which among other things 
provided a rich harvest of olive oil to the monks, was the object of a very long–running 
dispute between St-Ambrose and the house of Reichenau in Alemannia, with which 
Charles had extremely close links.
64
  The second charter also saw the king intervening in 
an ancient conflict, this time between the churches of Arezzo and Siena.
65
  Bishop John 
of Arezzo, whose church benefited from the document, was the pope‟s go-between with 
Charles the Bald, an arrangement that was undoubtedly connected with Charles‟s 
concession in 876 of influence to the papacy in the diocese of Arezzo.
66
  The fact that 
Charles the Fat‟s first two acts in Italy were peremptory decisions in favour of long-
standing claims of the church of Milan and the chief envoy of the pope is significant, and 
can be seen as part of a strategy for winning over Ansbert and John VIII.
67
  By neither act 
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could he have hoped to solve the relevant dispute, and indeed both came back to court 
within a matter of months.  Yet the important point is that he decided to intervene in these 
matters at all, and in view of the timing we should see them primarily as gestures issued 
with short-term political considerations in mind and intended for specific audiences.
68
  
The symbolism of these gestures not only publicised Charles‟s attitude to pope and 
archbishop, but also advertised his involvement with the broader political traditions of his 
new realm: they echoed, for example, the actions of Charlemagne, whose first act after 
his imperial coronation in 801 had been to assert his new position by ruling on the Arezzo 
– Siena dispute.69 
 
Our source for Charles‟s inauguration at Ravenna, which was based on an eye-witness 
report, relates that „all the bishops and counts and the rest of the leading men of Italy‟ 
were in attendance, and that „he bound all of them except the bishop of the apostolic see 
to the devotion of his service by swearing oaths.‟70  A survey of more of Charles‟s early 
charters confirms that his contacts were indeed as extensive as this version of events 
suggests.  In addition to further grants to the church in Milan, he made an early 
concession to Bishop Wibod of Parma, on whose shoulders responsibilities were laid by 
several Italian kings, and who was also in attendance at Ravenna.
71
  Charles further 
entrusted Wibod with strategic properties in the Apennines which were crucial for 
provisioning royal expeditions to and from Rome.
72
  The Empress Engelberga and 
members of her entourage also benefited from considerable royal largesse early in the 
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year 880.
73
  At Christmas in the same year the king cemented his relationship with the 
empress by confirming properties and privileges of the royal abbey of S. Salvatore / S. 
Giulia in Brescia at the request of her daughter Irmingarde, its proprietor.
74
  Berengar of 
Friuli‟s association with the new ruler was advertised when the pair sat in judgement, 
together with members of the marchio‟s extended family, on a placitum at Pavia in 
November 880.
75
  The king also advertised his relationship with some of the kingdom‟s 
main power-brokers by making them a series of interconnected land grants near the royal 
palace of Corteolona in 880-1.
76
 
 
Charles‟s many charters, then, do not constitute a checklist of alienated rights and 
properties which diminished royal power in favour of aristocratic.  Rather, they hint at 
attempts to form, maintain and advertise the political alliances with powerful aristocrats 
on which early medieval kingship depended.  That this endeavour was still working even 
in the very last years of Carolingian Italy is confirmed by the broad nature of the support 
that followed Charles the Fat to Rome in 881.  Nonetheless, such alliances between kings 
and aristocrats in this period could never be taken for granted, but had to be constantly 
maintained.  Charles mostly succeeded in this respect, but not without setbacks.  A feud 
between Berengar and the archchancellor, Bishop Liutward of Vercelli, temporarily set 
two of his chief supporters against each other in 886-7, a result of the parvenu bishop‟s 
unwelcome attempts to forcibly marry one of his relatives into the marchio‟s blue 
bloodline which may have reactivated north-east/north-west tensions.
77
  A clearer failure 
was in central and southern Italy, where Charles‟s influence was only as good as his 
unstable relationship with the rebellious Guy, dux of Spoleto; he was never able to 
intervene there in as direct a fashion as had Louis II.
78
  Despite this article‟s emphasis on 
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coherent aspects of royal strategy, such moments of crisis are an equally important part of 
the story, and serve to illustrate the contingent and precarious nature of royal power. 
 
Nevertheless, Charles the Fat‟s reign is striking in its contrast to the period of Italian 
conflict after the death of Louis II.  Why?  The king‟s careful use of patronage is part of 
the answer, but cannot completely explain why previously antagonistic parties were 
willing to back him.  Other candidates for the kingship were available: Charles‟s brother 
Louis the Younger, king of Saxony and Franconia, was also manoeuvring to make a bid 
for the crown after 876, and both he and Louis the Stammerer were courted by John VIII 
as possible successors during the illness of Karlmann.  However, the lessons taught by 
the divisions of the years 875-9, which were not confined to Italy, were taken on board by 
this new generation of Carolingians, and in 879-80 they agreed a new family settlement 
which brought to an end a number of outstanding political and territorial disputes.  These 
included the destination of the Italian realm, which was acknowledged by all parties as 
belonging to Charles the Fat.
79
  As the anxious letter of Anthony of Brescia showed, 
divisions in the ruling house caused tensions in the aristocracy.  The need, present or 
foreseen, to choose sides created considerable insecurity which damaged the confidence 
of nobles in the stability of their future positions and consequently undermined royal 
authority.  The fragile consensus in the configuration of the royal house during the early 
880s meant that Charles could be acknowledged by all aristocratic factions in Italy as the 
single source of royal patronage, and provided a fixed reference point around which 
disputes among the kingdom‟s ruling elite could revolve. 
 
This situation was not guaranteed to last.  To some extent the status quo was perpetuated 
by the early deaths of the emperor‟s relatives, which by late 884 left him as the only 
surviving legitimate male Carolingian.  His more frequent sojourns north of the Alps after 
that date, particularly to west Francia, did not therefore have the same destabilising effect 
as had Karlmann‟s absenteeism.  Another potential cause of division was the revolt of 
Boso of Vienne, who had himself proclaimed king in Provence in late 879.  Boso was 
married to Irmingarde, the daughter of Engelberga and Louis II, and had audaciously 
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named his children after his in-laws, marking his closeness to the former empress and his 
aspiration to appropriate a royal Carolingian identity.
80
  The count had further Italian 
links from the time he spent as Charles the Bald‟s representative in the regnum.81  
Mindful of the potential rift that the revolt could open up between himself and 
Engelberga, Charles the Fat took the empress with him to Alemannia to prevent her from 
mobilising her influence in favour of her son-in-law.  Although he kept her there for 
about two years, only releasing her on the final defeat of Boso in autumn 882, the 
emperor worked hard to maintain his relationship with her.  The flow of charters in 
favour of Engelberga, her followers and her institutions did not abate.
82
  She may or may 
not have colluded in her „kidnap‟: either way, she came quietly, thus avoiding the danger 
of fractures appearing in the network of political alliances established by Charles the Fat 
in his kingdom of Italy. 
 
4. Conclusion: Factionalism and conflict after 888 
 
Boso‟s rising was unique in the ninth century in its overt challenge to the Carolingians‟ 
monopoly on royal power.
83
  His defeat ensured the continuation of this dynastic 
monopoly.  However, when Charles the Fat died in January 888 without a legitimate heir, 
causing the definitive break-up of the Frankish empire, the situation necessarily changed.  
Rival bids for the Italian throne from the marchiones Berengar of Friuli and Guy of 
Spoleto renewed conflict among the aristocracy.  However, these events cannot be 
explained simply by invoking a tipping of the scales from royal to aristocratic power: the 
factional politics of the 890s were superficially similar to those of the 870s, but were not 
driven by the same dynamics.
84
  To finish this article, a few impressionistic examples will 
                                                 
80
 S. Airlie, „The Nearly Men: Boso of Vienne and Arnulf of Bavaria‟, in A. Duggan (ed.), Nobles and 
Nobility in Medieval Europe (Woodbridge, 2000), pp. 25-41, esp. pp. 32-5. 
81
 Nelson, Charles the Bald, pp. 242-3. 
82
 Kehr (ed.), Die Urkunden Karls, nos. 22, 28, 29, 56; cf. F. Bougard, „Engelberga‟, in Dizionario 
Biografico degli Italiani (vol. 13, Rome, 1993), pp. 668-76, at p. 673. 
83
 Airlie, „Semper fideles?‟. 
84
 Cf. Capitani, Storia, pp. 149-52.  Rosenwein, „Family Politics‟, esp. pp. 265-76 discusses networks 
within the aristocracy which helped determine the political behaviour of individual nobles; here I am only 
dealing with more general patterns of royal-aristocratic interaction. 
 20 
serve to illustrate some of the subtle but significant changes in patterns of royal patronage 
after 888. 
 
The claims of the post-888 competitors were not only equal but also inter- rather than 
intra-dynastic.  Although Berengar was a female-line descendant of Louis the Pious, 
unlike Guy, none of the „kinglets‟ who rose to power after the death of Charles the Fat 
could lay claim to the rhetoric of male-line legitimacy which had sustained the 
Carolingians, except perhaps Arnulf of Carinthia, Karlmann‟s bastard son.85  The second 
new development was that each contender had spent his whole political career in Italy, 
although Guy‟s initial bid for a crown in 888 was made in west Francia.86  As a result, 
each had well-established entourages and connections among the aristocracy.  These were 
focused primarily in their home bases of Friuli and Spoleto, but both men had 
connections in the heart of the regnum as well.  The fight was therefore very even in 
terms of both practical support and rhetorical justification. 
 
Guy won the first round with victory in the battle of the River Trebbia, forcing Berengar 
back to his north-eastern stronghold in Verona.  However, despite Guy‟s ascendancy 
Berengar maintained his claim to control all of Italy, and continued to issue charters as 
king.  This situation actively fomented tension within the aristocracy.  A telling example 
is the case of the county of Piacenza which, in the aftermath of Guy‟s victory at the 
Trebbia, was granted to Sigefrid, one of his leading supporters.
87
  However, in a charter 
issued by the would-be ruler Berengar at Verona in 890 we meet Adelgisus, the nephew 
of Engelberga who had been count of the city under Charles the Fat, also bearing the title 
of „illuster comes‟.88  Although Berengar did not control the region where Piacenza lay, 
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he evidently backed Adelgisus‟s claims in the city, which was one of the main centres of 
his family‟s power.  It is not difficult to see how a situation in which two men as 
powerful as Sigefrid and Adelgisus claimed the same honores (offices), and both with 
(competing) royal approval, was inherently destabilising.  Indeed, there is some evidence 
that the kings of the 890s actively encouraged this latent tension.  In 898 Berengar gave 
Count Ermenulf, his „comes militiae‟, rights in the county of Stazzona, on the western 
shore of Lake Maggiore, where he had interests before 888.
89
  This grant was, however, 
made after the implementation of a regnal division between Berengar and Lambert, 
Guy‟s son, and Stazzona was well into Lambert‟s territory.  The grant thus created an 
aspiration rather than establishing effective possession, as with Adelgisus‟s claim to 
Piacenza.  The respective aristocratic followings of Berengar and Guy were thus given 
vested interests in continuing the struggle between their kings.
90
 
 
The tactic of „hypothetically‟ granting the offices of hostile aristocrats to kings‟ allies 
was occasionally employed by Carolingian rulers.
91
  However, in Italy during the 890s 
such grants were used by kings to wrest control of the kingdom‟s heartlands, not just to 
snap up contested frontier regions, and also played out in the context of a new zero-sum 
dynastic game: rival Carolingian rulers at least recognised each other as potential kings.  
Multiple rulers meant multiple sources of patronage, and this helped aristocratic 
insecurity and conflict become an inbuilt feature of Italian politics, exacerbated by the 
arrival of transalpine pretenders who had no deep roots in the kingdom.  These patterns of 
patronage had an effect on the status of honores, an important basis of aristocratic 
authority.
92
  Institutional rivalries were actively enhanced and perpetuated by successive 
kings: for example, shortly after Berengar confirmed long-disputed rights in Limonta to 
St-Ambrose in Milan, Arnulf granted them to Reichenau, before Lambert returned them 
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to Milan.
93
  Where Charles the Fat had intervened in the Limonta dispute as a way of 
constructing consensus, the emergence of multiple aspirant dynasties meant that it now 
became an arena in which dynastic competition was played out.  Examples like this 
suggest a situation in which key estates and honores distributed by one king to build 
aristocratic alliances could be swiftly redistributed by the next, creating a plurality of 
claims and a general lack of confidence in the security of office- and property-holding.  
The resulting insecurity made it a small step for losers among the magnates to seek to 
restore their standing by inviting in „their own‟ king. 
 
The post-888 period is desperately in need of renewed historiographical attention.  These 
brief comments are intended only to highlight the complexity of the contemporary 
political scene and hence to underline this article‟s central argument: namely, that the 
factionalism that dominated Italian politics after 875 cannot be explained as a simple 
manifestation of the progressive decline of royal authority at the expense of disruptive 
aristocratic power.  Rather, fluctuating patterns of royal patronage must be seen as central 
to understanding aristocratic behaviour.  Dynastic politics did not cease to matter after the 
death of Louis II, as historians have often assumed.  On the contrary, dynastic and 
aristocratic politics remained intimately linked.  The turmoil in the years following 875 
was played out in a Carolingian framework, and its partial resolution in the reign of 
Charles the Fat followed from the restoration of concord within the ruling house.  The 
real breach came after 888 when the end of the Carolingian male line sparked off a 
struggle for kingship fought out by two native competitors who were equal in legitimacy 
and military strength.  Even when dynastic politics helped to perpetuate conflict through 
the weakness of rulers rather than to create consensus through their strength, in early 
medieval politics kings always mattered.  With this in mind, it is surely time that the 
political history of Italy after the death of Louis II was re-evaluated. 
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